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Executive Summary 1
Executive Summary
Highway advocates often claim that roads “pay for themselves,” with gasoline taxes and other charges 
to motorists covering—or nearly cover-
ing—the full cost of highway construction 
and maintenance.
They are wrong.
Highways do not—and, except for brief 
periods in our nation’s history—never have 
paid for themselves through the taxes that 
highway advocates label “user fees.” Yet 
highway advocates continue to suggest they 
do in an attempt to secure preferential ac-
cess to scarce public resources and to shape 
how those resources are spent.
To have a meaningful national debate 
over transportation policy—particularly at 
a time of tight public budgets—it is impor-
tant to get past the myths and address the 
real, difficult choices America must make 
for the 21st century.
Gasoline taxes aren’t “user fees.” 
Highway advocates often describe gaso-
line taxes as “user fees” in order to argue 
that those funds should be used only on 
highways. Yet, gasoline taxes are not user 
fees in any meaningful sense of the term. 
• “Fees” are not connected to “use” – The 
amount of money a particular driver 
pays in gasoline taxes bears little 
relationship to his or her use of roads 
funded by gas taxes—unlike other 
true user fees such as admission 
fees for state parks or turnpike tolls. 
Drivers on local streets and roads, for 
example, pay gasoline taxes for the 
miles they drive on those roads, even 
though those taxes are typically used 
to pay for state and federal highways. 
Efforts to ensure that residents of a 
given area “get back” what they pay 
in gasoline taxes—such as the federal 
equity bonus program—actually per-
petuate wasteful pork-barrel spending 
since they allocate money with no 
consideration of need or the benefits 
those investments would deliver to 
society.
• State gas taxes are often not entirely 
“extra” fees – Most states exempt 
gasoline from the state sales tax. The 
substitution of the gasoline tax for the 
sales tax diverts much of the money 
that would have gone into a state’s 
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general fund to a fund used often for 
the exclusive benefit of drivers. In 
some states, such as New Jersey, the 
gasoline tax is at times lower than 
the corresponding sales tax would 
be, meaning that drivers get a net tax 
subsidy that encourages the purchase 
of gasoline relative to other goods.
• Federal gas taxes have typically not been 
devoted exclusively to highways – The 
federal gas tax began its life as a 
deficit-fighting measure under Presi-
dent Herbert Hoover decades before 
the Interstate Highway System. Only 
during a brief 17-year period begin-
ning in 1956 did Congress temporarily 
dedicate gas tax revenues to construct 
the Interstate network, a project 
completed in the 1990s. Since 1973, 
the gasoline tax has been used to fund 
a variety of important transportation 
priorities and has periodically been 
used to reduce the federal deficit.
• Many states use gas tax revenue for a 
variety of purposes – While many states 
have historically dedicated their own 
state gasoline taxes to highways, that 
decision has not been universal. Ac-
cording to Federal Highway Adminis-
tration data, roughly 20 cents of every 
dollar collected in state gas taxes, 
motor vehicle fees or tolls nationwide 
is used for public transportation and 
other governmental purposes. Many 
of the states that do use gasoline taxes 
solely for highways do so because 
they remain bound by constitutional 
earmarks of gasoline taxes imposed as 
much as three-quarters of a century 
ago, regardless of whether those deci-
sions still make sense today.
 Highways don’t pay for themselves.
• Since 1947, the amount of money 
spent on highways, roads and streets 
has exceeded the amount raised 
through gasoline taxes and other 
so-called “user fees” by $600 billion 
(2005 dollars), representing a massive 
transfer of general government funds 
to highways.
• Highways “pay for themselves” less 
today than ever. Currently, highway 
“user fees” pay only about half the 
cost of building and maintaining the 
nation’s network of highways, roads 
and streets.
• These figures fail to include the 
many costs imposed by highway 
construction on non-users of the 
system, including damage to the en-
vironment and public health and en-
couragement of sprawling forms of 
development that impose major costs 
on the environment and government 
finances.
• New or expanded highways are even 
less likely to pay for themselves in 
the future as changing demographic 
conditions and consumer choices limit 
the growth in vehicle travel and fuel 
use that would otherwise provide the 
revenue for a major program of high-
way expansion.
Highway advocates use the “user 
fees/highways pay for themselves” myth 
in an effort to secure access to scarce 
government revenue for their desired 
public policy ends—distorting trans-
portation decision-making.
• Highway advocates often argue that 
the fact that highways come with their 
own built-in source of revenue in the 
form of gasoline taxes make them a 
financially conservative option relative 
to other transportation investments, 
but they typically fail to document 
whether the new or expanded roads 
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they propose will raise enough rev-
enue to pay for their costs. 
• Highway advocates often use fund-
ing myths to make public transit and 
other forms of transportation appear 
relatively more expensive—diverting 
attention from the full accounting of 
costs and benefits that should be the 
basis of sound transportation decision-
making.
To make the right choices for Amer-
ica’s transportation future, the na-
tion should take a smart approach to 
transportation investments, one that 
weighs the full costs and benefits of 
those investments and then allocates 
the costs of those investments fairly 
across society.
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There’s nothing as powerful as a good story. 
For thousands of years, the world’s great 
philosophers and spiritual teachers have 
used parables or allegories to get their 
message across. And for hundreds of years, 
parents have used fairy tales to instill moral 
lessons in their children.
For decades, advocates of a highway-cen-
tered transportation system have told their 
own powerful and compelling story. It isn’t 
as timeless as the stories of the Old Testa-
ment or as entertaining as the Brothers 
Grimm, but it has been extremely effective 
at shaping how American decision-makers 
think about transportation policy.
Let’s call it the Great Myth of Highway 
Finance.
The Great Myth begins, as so many 
myths do, with an arduous journey—in 
this case, then-Lieutenant Colonel Dwight 
D. Eisenhower’s 62-day cross-country trip 
with a military convoy along our nation’s 
rutted roads during the summer of 1919. 
Conditions like those faced by Eisenhower 
were all too familiar to the small but grow-
ing number of drivers, who clamored for 
public investment in better roads.
But how to pay for them? In the same 
year that Eisenhower made his journey, 
the state of Oregon hit upon an innovative 
method for raising money for the expensive 
task of improving the state’s roads—a tax 
on gasoline, the revenues of which were 
exclusively dedicated to highway improve-
ments.
As the years went on and the automobile 
became increasingly popular, more states 
followed Oregon’s lead. And in 1956, under 
the leadership of President Eisenhower, 
the federal government directed the rev-
enues from the federal gasoline tax to raise 
money for the largest public works project 
in human history: the Interstate Highway 
System.
In these good old times, the Interstate 
Highway System brought extraordinary 
prosperity, mobility and freedom to the 
land. Moreover, according to the Great 
Myth, it was paid for by those who used 
it—without meaningful subsidies from 
general taxpayers. The highways paid for 
themselves! And those who chose not to 
drive were supposedly none the worse off. 
According to the Great Myth, drivers not 
only endured but actually embraced1the gas 
tax since they knew they were paying for 
better roads.
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Every fairy tale needs a villain. Along 
the way, the story goes, politicians began 
to view the gas tax as a pot of money that 
could be used for “politically motivated”2 
projects (unlike highways, which tran-
scended politics). The wicked politicians 
began to “divert” money from the gasoline 
tax to other purposes—public transit, bike 
paths, even public education. As a result, 
the public that had once been so willing to 
pay the gasoline tax as a user fee for roads 
now lost faith in its appropriate use. And 
so the gas tax became one of the least-liked 
forms of taxation and that is why the na-
tion now finds itself without the resources 
needed to fix its aging roads, with little 
prospect of raising the gas tax to pay for 
new improvements.
Adherents of the Great Myth argue for a 
return to the good old days, when gasoline 
taxes were only used on highways, and that 
was that. 
But like all myths, the Great Myth of 
Highway Finance relies as much on fiction 
as fact. If it were a movie, it might best be 
described as “inspired by a true story.”
That’s because even during the so-called 
good old days gasoline taxes weren’t always 
used exclusively for roads, they have almost 
always failed to fully pay the cost of high-
ways, and non-drivers have always borne 
additional costs from highways in the form 
of disrupted neighborhoods, accidents, and 
a polluted environment. 
Correcting these myths might seem to 
be merely an historical exercise—and in 
an ideal world, it would be. But the Great 
Myth carries with it a set of false presump-
tions and the misreadings can severely 
distort transportation decision-making.
In a sensible world, America would 
invest in transportation projects that 
deliver the greatest benefits to the popu-
lation, and pay for those investments in 
ways that allocate the costs fairly across 
society—taking into account the many 
ways that transportation investments can 
benefit or harm individuals and businesses. 
In the world of the Great Myth, however, 
each transportation mode is presumed to 
survive only on the money its users can 
provide—and all of the money its users 
provide should go to that transportation 
mode, regardless of where the greatest 
benefits can be achieved.
In this paper, we aim to dismantle the 
Great Myth once and for all … with the 
hope that by doing so, America can get on 
with the critical debate about what types 
of transportation infrastructure to build 
and how to pay for them, free from false 
assumptions and the tired slogans of the 
past.
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Highway advocates often describe gasoline taxes as “user fees”—a term that suggests direct fees for service 
should be used specifically for highways. 
But gasoline taxes are not “user fees” in 
any meaningful sense. The amount of 
money that drivers pay in gasoline taxes 
is only loosely related to their use of the 
highways supported by these taxes. More-
over, in most states, state gas taxes are not 
a wholly additional fee paid by drivers, but 
rather supplant the state sales tax for fuel 
purchases—thus diverting money that 
would have gone into states’ general funds 
into separate funds that often exclusively 
benefit drivers. 
What Is a User Fee?  
And Who Is a User?
There are many competing academic defi-
nitions of a user fee. One element, however, 
that clearly separates user fees from other 
kinds of government levies is the fact that 
users of a given government service or fa-
cility pay them, and non-users don’t.
User fees are often levied for admission 
to government facilities or the use of gov-
ernment resources—for example, entrance 
fees to state parks or fees for grazing on 
federal land. User fees are also commonly 
applied for licensing or permitting, such as 
the issuance of a marriage license or pro-
cessing of a passport application. Finally, 
user fees may be levied on industries to 
defray the cost of government regulation, 
such as fees for the testing and approval of 
prescription drugs or for inspection of meat 
and poultry processing facilities.
In most of these cases, it is crystal clear 
who the “user” of the given government 
service is—the visitor to the state park, 
the applicant for a permit or license, or the 
regulated party. In some cases, the user is 
not the only beneficiary of the service—for 
example, the public benefits from effective 
testing of prescription drugs—and the 
method of setting user fees is designed not 
necessarily to maximize revenue, but rather 
to maximize the benefits to the public.3
When it comes to highways, though, 
who, exactly, is a “user”?
If you consider anyone who drives on a 
highway anywhere in the country a “user,” 
then it might be fair to call gasoline taxes 
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user fees. Everyone who drives uses a road, 
and everyone who drives on a road4 pays the 
gas tax. It sounds simple enough. 
Except for this: most of the money that 
is spent on local roads and streets—which 
account for the majority of public road 
lane-miles5 and about 13 percent of ve-
hicle travel—comes not from “user fees” 
but from other taxes, often local property 
taxes. People who drive on these streets and 
roads are “users” in the sense that they pay 
federal and state gasoline taxes for their 
driving on those roads, but not when it 
comes to reaping the benefits.6 In short, 
they pay twice for their use of local roads, 
while users of other highways pay less.
Moreover, drivers who use vehicles 
with better fuel economy pay less into the 
system than those who drive gas guzzlers, 
since the collection system for gasoline 
taxes is based on fuel sales, not mileage 
driven. There are very good reasons for 
setting the system up this way—a gaso-
line tax is relatively inexpensive to collect 
and has the side benefit of encouraging 
conservation. But it is yet another way in 
which the fees charged to drivers through 
gasoline taxes are unrelated to their use of 
the system.
The “user fee” argument breaks down 
in a more fundamental way, however. The 
understanding implied in describing gaso-
line taxes as user fees is that the money an 
individual motorist pays in gasoline taxes 
will come back to pay for the roads he or 
she uses. In practice, however, this has 
never been the case—the Interstate High-
way System, for example, was built largely 
using gasoline taxes charged to drivers on 
other roads.
Moreover, the direct linkage between 
user fees and user benefits that is a hallmark 
of true “user fees” is an almost impossible 
standard to meet with regard to highways, 
for the simple reason that some transporta-
tion investments are inherently more costly 
than others or their benefits are more 
diffuse. Adding a lane to a crowded urban 
Interstate, or reconfiguring that highway to 
have less impact on the surrounding com-
munity, may be a reasonable, if expensive, 
investment, even if the amount of money 
generated from gas taxes paid by motor-
ists who use that highway cannot possibly 
cover the cost.
Over the years, however, some public 
officials have tried to attain a direct linkage 
by aligning the amount residents of a given 
area pay in gasoline taxes with the amount 
they “get back” in road services. The equity 
bonus program at the federal level, for 
example, ensures that states each get back 
at least a 92 percent share of the money 
their drivers pay into the highway account 
of the Highway Trust Fund.7 Some states 
take this impulse even further by dividing 
highway spending proportionally within 
geographic districts of their states.
In their efforts to create a more accurate 
link between user fees and user benefits, 
however, these public officials have cre-
ated another problem: wasteful allocation 
of public resources. There is a term for 
doling out government money with little 
consideration of the benefits to the public: 
pork-barrel spending. Treating gasoline 
taxes as user fees encourages unnecessary 
spending in some areas, while starving 
other areas of needed resources for projects 
that could deliver far greater benefits to so-
ciety as a whole. This includes the prospect 
of spending money to build new highways 
in one region while ignoring the need to 
rebuild or repair decaying infrastructure 
in another area.8
In short, from the perspective of the 
individual motorist, there is not a clear 
connection between the “fees” he or she 
pays in gasoline taxes and his or her use of 
the gas-tax supported highway system. And 
there is very little connection between the 
amount of money a person pays in gasoline 
taxes and the resulting impacts on the roads 
they use. Because the relationship between 
the taxes drivers pay and their use of the 
facilities that benefit from those fees is so 
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tenuous, intellectually honest observers of-
ten have a hard time calling gasoline taxes 
“user fees.” In a recent study of government 
user fee policies, for example, the federal 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
referred to gasoline taxes as “excise taxes 
with a ‘user pays’ element.”9 
Are Gas Taxes For  
“Something Extra”?
That fascinating GAO study also states 
that: “In general, a user fee is related to 
some voluntary transaction or request for 
government goods or services above and 
beyond what is normally available to the 
public.”10 Visitors to a park might enter 
free, for instance, but pay extra to enter 
the zoo. In the earlier examples, persons 
seeking to get married, win Food and 
Drug Administration approval for a new 
prescription drug, graze their cattle on 
government land, or camp in a national 
park obtain special services from the gov-
ernment. In most cases, “users” pay a fee 
to the government for these services that is 
over and above their normal tax burden.11 
With a true “user fee,” in other words, 
users pay something extra to get something 
extra.
But are gasoline taxes really an extra 
payment that drivers make for the extra 
Figure 1. States that Dedicate Gas Tax Revenue to Highways and Those That Exempt 
Gasoline Sales from Sales Taxes13
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State
Alabama	 $0.09		 $0.09	
Arizona	 $0.13		 $0.05	
Arkansas	 $0.13		 $0.09	
Colorado	 $0.06		 $0.16	
Connecticut	 $0.13	 $0.29	
Idaho	 $0.14		 $0.11	
Iowa	 $0.13		 $0.08	
Kansas	 $0.11		 $0.13	
Kentucky		 $0.14		 $0.08	
Louisiana		 $0.09		 $0.11	
Maine		 $0.12		 $0.18	
Maryland		 $0.13		 $0.10	
Massachusetts		 $0.14		 $0.07	
Minnesota	 $0.15		 $0.12	
Mississippi	 $0.15		 $0.03	
Missouri	 $0.09		 $0.08	
Nebraska	 $0.12		 $0.15	
Nevada		 $0.16		 $0.07	
New	Jersey	 $0.15		 ($0.01)
New	Mexico	 $0.11		 $0.06	
North	Carolina	 $0.12		 $0.20	
North	Dakota	 $0.12		 $0.11	
Ohio	 $0.12		 $0.16	
Oklahoma	 $0.10		 $0.06	
Pennsylvania	 $0.13		 $0.19	
Rhode	Island	 $0.16		 $0.16	
South	Carolina		 $0.13		 $0.03	
South	Dakota	 $0.09		 $0.13	
Tennessee	 $0.15		 $0.05	
Texas	 $0.14		 $0.06	
Utah	 $0.11		 $0.13	
Vermont	 $0.14		 $0.05	
Virginia		 $0.11		 $0.07	
Washington	 $0.15		 $0.22	
West	Virginia	 $0.14		 $0.19	
Wisconsin	 $0.11		 $0.20	
Wyoming	 $0.09		 $0.04	
Table 1. Value of the Sales Tax Exemption on Gasoline vs. “Extra” Amount Driv-
ers Pay in Gasoline Taxes Over and Above the Amount Exempted from Sales Tax14 
(Table Includes States that Both Assess a State Sales Tax and Exempt Gasoline from 
It. Italicized States Dedicate Gas Tax to Highways)
Value of the sales tax 
exemption on gasoline, 
per gallon.
“Extra” amount paid by driv-
ers per gallon over and above 
what they would have paid if 
the sales tax were in force.
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privilege of using highways? 
To answer that question, one needs to 
look at taxes together. If people who pay 
more in user fees simultaneously get a 
break on another tax, they can hardly be 
described as paying “extra” for the addi-
tional privileges they receive.
Yet, that is exactly the situation in many 
states that charge drivers gasoline taxes but 
simultaneously exempt the sale of gasoline 
from the state sales tax. In 37 states and 
the District of Columbia, drivers do not 
pay state sales taxes on their purchases of 
gasoline.12 Instead, they pay a gasoline tax 
which, in 24 of these states, is statutorily 
or constitutionally designated to be used 
on highways. 
In other words, by dedicating money 
raised through the gasoline tax to high-
ways, many states are actually diverting 
money that could otherwise flow into the 
state’s general fund to instead be used for 
the exclusive benefit of drivers. (See Table 
1.) In most of these states, the amount of 
money that is diverted from the general 
fund (as a result of the sales tax exemption 
on gasoline) exceeds the “extra” amount 
that drivers pay over and above the amount 
they would pay under a sales tax. 
Seen in this context, the idea of divert-
ing sales tax revenue to improve highways 
because these taxes were paid during the 
course of using highways is an odd one. It 
would be akin to devoting the tax revenue 
from the sale of televisions solely to pay 
for improved network programming, or 
using revenues from the sale of clothing to 
provide scholarships for budding fashion 
designers. 
Two important points arise from this 
discussion. First, the notion that drivers 
pay “extra” into the system through state 
What About Tolls?
There are, of course, real “user fees” assessed on some American roads: tolls. Un-like gasoline taxes, tolls are true user fees—users pay them, non-users don’t, and 
users generally pay in proportion to the amount of the service they consume.17
The problem with tolling, however, is that only a small portion of the nation’s 
highways could truly “pay for themselves” in this way. In other words, if the true cost 
of building, say, Boston’s Big Dig or a rural highway in Idaho were to be charged to 
its users, the tolls would be so high that they would deter some or all drivers from 
using them—defeating the purpose of building the highway in the first place.
The recent track record of privately financed toll roads in the United States—
which includes the financial struggles of roads such as California’s SR-91 express 
lanes and Texas’ Camino Columbia toll road—underscores just how iffy a proposi-
tion it can be to self-finance modern highways with toll revenue—especially since 
the private companies have relatively high capital costs and must skim off a profit 
share to investors.18
The inadequacy of tolling for building a truly national system of highways was 
recognized by the architects of the Interstate Highway System. A 1938 federal report 
found that the amount of expected long-distance traffic was insufficient to support 
toll highways.19 In the 1950s, experts estimated that no more than 9,000 miles of 
highway (compared with the more than 3 million miles of highway in existence at 
that time) could support themselves with tolls.20 
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gasoline taxes is vastly overstated. Second, 
the shuffling that allows drivers to shift 
a part of their tax burden to a fund that 
largely benefits themselves is something 
extremely rare in our tax system. It is an 
exception—not the realization of some 
universally accepted principle of public 
finance.15
To be fair, in a few states drivers pay 
both the gasoline tax and the sales tax, and 
drivers generally wind up paying somewhat 
more in gasoline excise taxes than they 
would if the state sales tax were imposed 
on gasoline instead. But even this isn’t 
universally true. Had New Jersey, for ex-
ample, charged its 7 percent state sales tax 
on motor gasoline purchases in June 2010, 
it would have generated approximately 15.4 
cents per gallon in general revenue for 
the state, compared to the 14.5 cents per 
gallon the state actually took in through 
its gasoline tax.16 In other words, the tax 
system in New Jersey actually encourages 
the consumption of gasoline vis-à-vis other 
consumer goods by charging a lower tax 
rate for gasoline sales. If gas prices con-
tinue to rise faster than inflation while 
gas taxes lag behind inflation, then this 
net tax subsidy for gasoline will become 
more common.
Origins of the Gas Tax:  
Sorting Historical Fact  
from Fiction
Even if gasoline taxes are only loosely re-
lated to drivers’ use of the gas tax-funded 
highway system and even though the sales 
tax exemptions often divert money from 
general funds into funds for the benefit 
of drivers, highway advocates nonetheless 
often portray the dedication of gas tax rev-
enues to highways as part of an historical 
grand bargain made between government 
and highway users. 
To some highway advocates, the grand 
bargain through which highway users 
agreed to pay gasoline taxes in exchange for 
using those funds solely to improve roads 
takes on the aura of great societal compacts 
like the Magna Carta or the Declaration 
of Independence. But is it true? Was there 
a “grand bargain” or founding principle 
for future generations, in which citizens 
agreed to taxation of gasoline only if the 
revenues were spent on roads? 
The answers to these questions are a lit-
tle different depending on which gasoline 
tax you are talking about. If one is talking 
about state gasoline taxes the answer in 
many states is “sort of.” For the federal gas 
tax, the answer is a clear “no.” Just asking 
this question, however, raises another: why 
should any bargain about highway finance 
made as much as 80 years ago dictate how 
America invests in transportation under 
very different circumstances today?
The Federal Gas Tax
Highway advocates often begin their his-
tory of the federal gasoline tax in 1956. 
That is the year that Congress enacted the 
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, which 
created the Interstate Highway System, and 
the Highway Revenue Act of 1956, which 
funded it. 
Robert Poole and Adrian Moore of the 
Reason Foundation, for example, advocate 
that the federal gasoline tax should be 
devoted to the Interstate system “as was 
intended when the federal gas tax was 
created.”21 
There is just one problem with this 
history of the federal gas tax—it starts a 
quarter-century too late. 
It was President Herbert Hoover who, 
in 1932, proposed a federal gas tax—not 
to raise money for roads, but to pay down 
the federal deficit. For the next 24 years, 
federal gasoline taxes were deposited into 
the general fund. According to the Federal 
Highway Administration, “Although taxes 
on motor fuels and automobile products 
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were in existence, they were not linked to 
funding for highways. At the time, financ-
ing for the highway program and revenues 
from automobile and related products were 
included under the public finance principle 
of ‘spend where you must, and get the 
money where you can.’”22 
The 1956 laws diverted the two-cent gas 
tax that had previously funded general gov-
ernment operations to the new Highway 
Trust Fund and added an additional penny 
that was also deposited in the fund. Such 
began an exceptional 17-year period dur-
ing which revenues were used exclusively 
for highways, a period that lasted until 
1973, when states were first permitted to 
reallocate money from discontinued urban 
highway projects to transit. 
The highways-only era was a mere blip 
in the 78-year history of the federal gas tax. 
The last two major increases in the federal 
gasoline tax—in 1990 and 1993—were 
dedicated in whole or in part toward defi-
cit reduction, the original purpose of the 
federal gasoline tax when it was adopted 
in 1932.23
There are good reasons to believe that 
Congress, in passing the 1956 law, did not 
Did Congress Establish a Gas Tax/User Fee “Policy”? 
Highway advocates sometimes point to the text of a 1934 law to claim that the U.S. Congress intended for gasoline taxes to be strictly devoted to highways. The text 
of the Hayden-Cartwright Act seems plain enough, stating: “Since it is unfair and 
unjust to tax motor vehicle transportation unless the proceeds of such taxation are 
applied to the construction, improvement or maintenance of highways, after June 30, 
1935, Federal aid for highway construction shall be extended only to those States that 
use at least the amounts now provided by law . . . for the construction, improvement 
and maintenance of highways and administrative expenses in connection therewith 
. . . and for no other purpose.”25 
The American Highway Users Alliance—a highway advocacy trade group—claims 
that the law “declared congressional policy against diversion of highway funds for 
non-highway purposes.”26 However, this distorts the historical record. It is unlikely 
that Congress meant for the law to establish this “policy” for two reasons:
First, establishing a policy against “diversion” of gas tax revenue was not the 
Hayden-Cartwright Act’s primary purpose. Rather, it was to fund a massive fed-
eral investment in highways as a response to the Great Depression. Policy-makers 
understandably wanted to ensure that states would not meet this increase in federal 
investment with reductions in highway spending from their own revenue sources. 
Hence the requirement that states spend the amounts “now provided by law” on 
highways—allowing states that were already using gasoline taxes for non-highway 
purposes to continue to do so without penalty.27 Thus, the measure was not meant 
to change how new revenues were allocated; it was intended to prevent a reduction 
in existing state spending in the face of those new revenues.
Second, the federal government was, at the very moment the Hayden-Cartwright Act 
was enacted, using taxes on gasoline for non-highway purposes, namely, reducing the 
federal deficit. Congress could hardly have intended the law as a general statement 
of principle when it was in the midst of violating that very principle itself.
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intend to link the gas tax and highway ex-
penditures on a permanent basis. 
Indeed, the 1956 Highway Revenue 
Act dedicated the federal gasoline tax to 
the Highway Trust Fund explicitly only 
until 1972, by which time the Interstate 
Highway System would presumably be 
complete. Beyond that point, the 1956 law 
left the gasoline tax to revert to one-and-
a-half cents and again be deposited again 
into the general fund.24 
In short, funding roads was not the 
“original purpose” of the federal gas tax 
when it was created in 1932. Nor did Con-
gress ever promise that all federal gasoline 
taxes would forever after be dedicated to 
roads. Nor has dedicating federal gas taxes 
exclusively to roads even been the histori-
cal norm.
State Gas Taxes
Where highway advocates stand on some-
what sturdier historical ground is in the 
assertion that state gasoline taxes have been 
promised to highways. Indeed, the need to 
raise money for highway expansion was the 
stated rationale for the creation of most 
state gasoline taxes. 
In 1919, Oregon adopted the first state 
gasoline tax, which was legislatively dedi-
cated to highway improvements.28 By the 
time the federal gasoline tax was adopted 
in 1932, every state had adopted a gasoline 
tax.29 
Many states followed Oregon’s example 
and adopted statutory or constitutional 
limitations requiring gas tax revenue to 
be spent on highways—as of 2003, 22 
states had constitutional provisions that 
earmark vehicle fees to highway construc-
tion, while eight states had similar statutory 
earmarks.30 (See Figure 1 on page 8.)
Even so, there remain many states 
that do not promise gas tax revenue to 
highways. In some of these states— such 
as Maryland, New York and Wisconsin—
gasoline taxes can be used for a variety of 
transportation purposes. In other states, 
gasoline tax revenue is deposited into the 
general fund. Texas even dedicates part of 
its gas tax to a non-transportation purpose: 
public education.31
The larger question with regard to 
these dedications of tax revenue is whether 
decisions made by legislators in a very dif-
ferent era should still hold sway today. In 
many states, constitutional earmarking 
of gasoline tax revenues dates back more 
than three-quarters of a century—a con-
stitutional limitation was adopted in Min-
nesota in 1923, in Colorado in 1934, in New 
Hampshire in 1938, and in Washington 
state in 1944, for example.32 
These decisions to dedicate gas tax 
revenues to highways came at a time when 
America was a fundamentally different 
country. Between 1910 and 2000, the share 
of Americans living in metropolitan areas 
ballooned from 28 percent to 80 percent.33 
As late as the mid-1960s, America still pro-
duced the majority of our oil domestically 
and dependence on foreign oil was not a 
major worry.34As late as the post-War years, 
most streetcar and other urban mass transit 
systems remained privately owned. Most 
importantly, America had not yet invested 
trillions of dollars in its highways, at the 
expense of other, long-neglected modes of 
transportation.
In rapidly urbanizing or suburbanizing 
states, the existence of these difficult-to-
undo constitutional provisions straitjackets 
government as it considers the most ef-
fective means of providing transportation 
for its citizens. In New Hampshire, for 
example, a 2004 court decision prevented 
the state from using gasoline tax reve-
nue—which is constitutionally dedicated to 
highways—to extend a Boston-area com-
muter rail line to the southern portion of 
the state, a move that would have benefited 
drivers by reducing congestion on a grid-
locked highway used largely by commuters 
to Boston.35 The state of Washington now 
faces a lawsuit seeking to prevent the state 
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from building a light rail line in the median 
of Interstate 90, despite the fact that the 
interstate was specifically designed to allow 
for future light rail, no state gas tax money 
is being used for the rail line, and the light 
rail project was approved by the region’s 
voters. The case hinges on whether the use 
of a small share of state gas tax revenue for 
the original construction of Interstate 90 
decades ago precludes the construction of 
light rail using other funds now.36
These restraints on lawmakers’ ability 
to dedicate tax revenue to the most im-
portant public priorities—or even, in the 
Washington case, to build transit systems 
using other sources of revenue—are often 
opposed by public policy experts. The Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures, for 
example, frowns on earmarking funds for 
particular uses, noting that it “often impos-
es rigidities into the budgeting system that 
do not permit flexible allocations of general 
revenue among competing uses.”37 
In truth, negotiation with regard to the 
allocation of societal resources and respon-
sibilities is an ongoing process. While some 
principles are eternal—including freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion, and equal 
rights under the law—the dedication of 
gas tax revenue to highways isn’t one of 
them. 
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“By any measure, highways are 
one of the most successful govern-
ment programs in America. They 
are heavily used for very valuable 
purposes and they pretty much 
pay for themselves.”38
–  American Dream Coalition 
“Because most of the costs of 
highways are paid out of gas taxes, 
subsidies to driving are very low 
and mainly by local governments 
for local roads.”39
–  Randal O’Toole, 
Cato Institute
“[H]ighways and aviation … are 
essentially self-supporting. You’re 
talking about using general tax 
revenue to create a new mode 
(high-speed rail) to compete with 
user-fee-supported modes whose 
infrastructure is 100 percent paid 
for by user fees.”
–  Robert Poole, 
Reason Institute, on proposed 
federal high-speed rail  
investments40
The notion that highways “pay for 
themselves” through gas taxes and vehicle 
charges is a key part of the transportation 
funding mythology crafted by highway 
advocates. Most intellectually honest ad-
vocates of this point of view add caveats 
to this conclusion—highways, they say, 
“mostly,” “almost always” or “pretty much” 
pay for themselves. But the implications 
of the argument are the same: highways 
come with their own source of revenue that 
defrays most, if not all, of the cost of their 
construction and continued operations. 
Highways, however, have never fully 
“paid for themselves” through user revenue 
and are more dependent today on subsidies 
from general taxpayers than at any time in 
recent history. The fees drivers pay also 
don’t even begin to pay for the many costs 
that highways impose on non-drivers, and 
are unlikely to be sufficient in the future 
to fuel the increase in highway capacity 
favored by highway advocates.
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Highways Have Not  
Historically “Paid for  
Themselves”
Gasoline taxes and other charges on drivers 
have not come anywhere close to paying for 
the cost of constructing and maintaining 
America’s roads. And, with a few historical 
exceptions, they never have.
The case most often cited of highways 
“paying for themselves” is the Interstate 
Highway System. Robert Poole of the 
Reason Institute, for example, states that 
“the Interstate system was paid for 100 
percent by its users.”41 The construction 
of the Interstate system was more or less 
entirely paid for by federal gasoline taxes 
and vehicle charges. But it was not—as 
Poole asserts—paid for by users of the 
Interstate system, which, after all, did not 
yet exist when the gas taxes that paid for 
its construction were created. Instead, 
the Interstate system was paid for largely 
by drivers using other roads under the 
assumption that they (or perhaps their 
children) would someday benefit from the 
future Interstate system. 
The Interstate Highway System cur-
rently constitutes only 2.5 percent of the 
nation’s total roadway lane-miles.42 As 
a result, touting the Interstate highway 
system as exemplifying the larger system 
is highly misleading. What happens if we 
look at the system as a whole?
If one compares all spending on high-
ways by all levels of government with total 
revenue from so-called user fees, it quickly 
becomes apparent that America’s highways 
do not now—and, except for brief periods, 
never have—“paid for themselves” in the 
aggregate. Since 1947, America’s spending 
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on highways at all levels (federal, state 
and local) has exceeded the amount of 
money collected in gasoline and vehicle 
taxes and tolls by more than $600 billion 
(2005 dollars).43 
Historically, much of this net subsidy 
of highways has come in the form of local 
spending on streets and secondary roads, 
which are largely paid for from property 
tax or general tax revenue.45 In 2008, local 
governments spent more than $31 billion 
on highways raised from property taxes, 
assessments, and general fund revenues.46
There have been few studies of whether 
individual highways “pay for themselves.” 
A 2008 study conducted for the state of 
Texas evaluated seven sample highways, 
finding that none of them would likely pay 
for their full costs, with the percentage of 
costs paid for by user revenue ranging from 
13 percent to 93 percent.47
Highways Pay for  
Themselves Less than  
Ever Today
In recent years, state and federal govern-
ments have diverted even more resources 
from general forms of taxation toward 
roadways. In 2007, so-called “user fees” 
paid for a smaller share of the cost of high-
ways than at any time since the launch of 
the Highway Trust Fund in 1956. Accord-
ing to the Pew Charitable Trusts’ Subsi-
dyScope project, user fees paid for only 51 
percent of highway costs, down 10 percent 
over the course of a single decade.48 
Even if all “user fee” revenues were 
devoted to highways, they would still pay 
less than two-thirds of the nation’s high-
way bill.49
General fund subsidies of highway 
spending have become even larger in the 
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last few years. The SubsidyScope analysis 
was conducted with the most current data, 
which at the time extended to 2007. In 
2009 the federal Highway Trust Fund was 
poised to go into deficit for the first time in 
its history—triggering a series of ongoing 
bailouts from the general fund. To ad-
dress this looming shortfall, in September 
2008, the federal government transferred 
an emergency $8 billion from the general 
fund to the Highway Trust Fund.50 There 
were further infusions of money from the 
general fund of $7 billion in July 2009 and 
$19.5 billion in March 2010.51 In addition, 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act allocated $27 billion to highway infra-
structure investment.52 
The reasons for the decline in the share 
of highway costs covered by gas taxes and 
other “user fees” are not mysterious. The 
federal gasoline tax and most state gasoline 
taxes are not indexed for inflation, and the 
federal gasoline tax has not been increased 
since 1993. In 1999, federal gasoline and 
diesel taxes collected $29.8 billion for high-
ways, and in 2008, the same taxes collected 
$30.6 billion for highways. 54 Adjusted for 
inflation, the yearly taxes collected between 
1999 and 2008 shrank 32 percent, even 
though we continued to build more new 
roads and bridges.55 
At the same time, vehicle travel—which 
increased at a more or less steady rate for 
decades—began to level off in the mid-
2000s, and has actually declined from 
the all-time peak in 2007.56 As Americans 
drive fewer miles, they pay fewer gasoline 
taxes, even as the number of lane-miles of 
highway that require maintenance remains 
the same or increases. Meanwhile, vehicle 
fuel economy—which had been stagnant 
or declining since the late 1980s—began 
to increase in the late 2000s in response 
to rising gasoline prices and tighter federal 
fuel economy requirements, reducing the 
amount of gasoline taxes Americans pay 
for every mile they travel. Vehicles sold in 
model year 2009 were the most fuel-effi-
cient of any model year in U.S. history.57 
In short, American drivers are paying 
lower gas taxes (in terms of purchasing 
power) on relatively fewer gallons of gaso-
line. Whereas at one time gasoline taxes 
and other fees on drivers raised much of 
the money needed to build and maintain 
highways, these sources of revenue pres-
ently barely pay for even half of highway 
costs. 
How high would gasoline taxes need to 
be to cover the gap? A 2007 study estimated 
that “user fee” payments to governments 
fall short of government expenditures re-
lated to highways by the equivalent of 20 
to 70 cents per gallon.58 That estimate is 
overly conservative because since that time 
gas taxes have remained stagnant and the 
number of gallons taxed has fallen. The 
figure also omits the additional unpaid-for 
costs that drivers impose on each other and 
non-drivers.
Driving Doesn’t Pay its  
Full Costs
The reason the accounting of road costs 
and taxes is so politically charged and con-
sequential is because the issue nests within 
broader questions about fair taxation. To 
some extent, judgments about whether 
the highway system or gas taxes should be 
expanded hinge on whether highways are 
viewed as net contributors to society at cur-
rent tax levels. The issue isn’t just whether 
taxes and fees levied on driving cover the 
costs of construction and maintenance. It’s 
whether the contributions paid through 
highway system cover the costs imposed 
on society.
The user fee/highways pay for them-
selves argument is rooted in the idea that 
those who benefit from a given govern-
ment investment should be responsible for 
paying for it through taxes—a framework 
economists call the benefits principle of 
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taxation (as in “those who reap the benefits 
should pay”). 
Highway advocates conclude that if 
drivers were paying for the full cost of 
highway construction and maintenance 
with gasoline taxes, they would be “paying 
their own way.” Nothing could be further 
from the truth. 
Indeed, for the benefits principle of taxa-
tion to apply, the amount that people pay 
for highways (or other forms of transporta-
tion infrastructure) would have to match 
their net benefit from the infrastructure. 
This would mean compensating those who 
are harmed by construction and operation 
of the infrastructure.
Interestingly, during the 1940s (a time 
when the federal gas tax was still deposited 
in the general fund) the highway lobby 
argued that federal aid to support state 
highway networks should not come from 
user fees, but rather from general revenue, 
given the tremendous perceived national 
benefits of those investments, even to 
non-users. As the head of the National 
Highway Users Conference (the forerun-
ner to today’s American Highway Users 
Alliance) argued:
The Federal Government should 
pay for such aid from sources 
of general taxation, because the 
benefits of that spending—to the 
national defense, to interstate 
commerce, to mail delivery and 
to the general welfare—are not 
limited to any special taxpaying 
group.59
The cost of building and maintaining 
highways has long been recognized, there-
fore, as just one cost of driving. “Users” 
are not the only people who benefit or are 
harmed by transportation investments. 
There are many ways in which the decision 
to build transportation infrastructure—or 
the decision of an individual driver to use 
that infrastructure—can impose costs or 
deliver benefits to people other than us-
ers. Among the other potential costs and 
benefits are:
• Impacts on the efficiency of other 
transportation modes—for example, 
the degree to which a new highway 
lane speeds up bus trips, or makes 
pedestrian crossings more difficult.
• Changes in the risk of accidents, 
including injuries to non-drivers and 
damages to property. 
• Air pollution impacts, including emis-
sions of pollutants that contribute to 
the formation of health-threatening 
smog and soot as well as greenhouse 
gases.
• Other environmental impacts, includ-
ing water pollution from highway 
runoff, impacts on wildlife (habitat 
disruption, road kill, etc.), and impacts 
to recreational enjoyment of the out-
doors.
• Energy policy impacts, including the 
economic impacts of changes in fossil 
fuel demand as well as the national 
security implications of protecting ac-
cess to imported fossil fuels.
• Impacts on development, recognizing 
that different transportation invest-
ments contribute to different develop-
ment patterns. Highway construction 
might support more spread-out 
forms of development with higher 
infrastructure costs for water, sewer, 
electricity and flood control, as well 
as impacts on community cohesion, 
public health and aesthetic values.
• Costs and benefits to businesses, in-
cluding changes in land value and ac-
cessibility, as well as the costs imposed 
on businesses to provide access to the 
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new infrastructure (such as the cost of 
providing parking spaces, bike racks, 
or shuttle buses to transit stations).
• Costs of maintenance and operations 
that will be incurred in the future. 
• Impacts on specific sub-populations, 
including those who may not have 
direct access to the infrastructure. For 
highways, this includes populations 
that cannot drive, including some of 
the elderly, the severely disabled, chil-
dren, and those who cannot afford an 
automobile. Infrastructure decisions 
can also impact the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of government programs 
designed to assist these populations, 
such as the ability of the infrastruc-
ture to provide access to jobs or to 
support the ability of the elderly to 
remain in familiar surroundings as 
they age.
• Impacts on private investment in 
transportation vehicles—e.g., the need 
for residents of a given community to 
own and maintain a private vehicle in 
order to live their daily lives, and the 
impact of infrastructure investments 
on the wear and tear on those vehicles.
• Broader economic benefits, including 
agglomeration economies, expanded 
access to jobs and markets, and tour-
ism.
• Quality of life, including the impact 
of the investment on the potential for 
active transportation, such as walk-
ing and biking, which provides health 
benefits, as well as access to commu-
nity institutions, aesthetic values, and 
other, difficult-to-quantify benefits.
The list goes on and on. 
The point is that highways (as well as oth-
er forms of transportation infrastructure) 
impose significant external costs—that is, 
costs to non-users—or deliver significant 
external benefits. These costs and benefits 
are not accounted for in gas taxes or other 
user fees.
The costs of driving begin to add up 
quickly. A 2009 study by the Victoria 
Transport Policy Institute (VTPI) es-
timates that 35 percent of the cost of 
driving consists of external costs. VTPI 
estimates that the full cost of a mile of 
driving—including fuel, ownership and 
external costs—ranges from 94 cents per 
vehicle mile for rural driving to as much 
as $1.64 per mile for urban rush hour driv-
ing.60 Another 2007 study, by researchers 
at Resources for the Future, estimated 
that the external costs imposed by driv-
ing amounted to approximately $2.10 per 
gallon.61
We do not suggest here that fuel taxes 
ought to rise to cover the entire external 
costs of driving. What is important is that 
when highway advocates claim or suggest 
that highways “pay for themselves,” they 
are not only factually wrong from the nar-
row perspective of users paying for the cost 
of building and maintaining highways, but 
they also miss a large part of the picture: 
the costs imposed by drivers on others. 
Will Highways Pay for  
Themselves in the Future?
Highway advocates frequently hearken 
back to the experiences of yesteryear in 
suggesting that highways can or should 
pay for themselves in the future. Yet, the 
America of the early 21st century is not the 
America of the 1950s, and the assump-
tions that led to the gasoline tax being 
considered a stable source of income for 
highway expansion at that time likely do 
not apply today. 
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The question of whether new or ex-
panded highways can be expected to pay 
for themselves creates a Catch-22 for 
highway advocates. On one hand, for a new 
or expanded highway to “pay for itself,” it 
must result in a significant overall increase 
in miles driven and fuel consumption. 
On the other hand, however, increasing 
the number of miles driven on a highway 
undercuts the most common rationale for 
highway construction: reducing conges-
tion. Indeed, if a highway expansion project 
truly succeeds in reducing congestion, 
motorists will sit less in traffic and burn less 
fuel—reducing gasoline tax revenue. 
Historically, however, highway expan-
sion has been shown to increase the amount 
of driving by inducing new trips and 
changing land-use patterns in ways that 
lead to more driving.62 If those historical 
trends remain in force, new or expanded 
highways would pay for at least some of the 
costs of their construction through new 
gasoline tax revenue. But those increases 
in revenue would also come with substan-
tial additional costs—more cars on the 
road, increases in air pollution and global 
warming emissions, increased congestion 
on other roads, and increased dependence 
on fossil fuels. How those costs and ben-
efits would balance out for any particular 
proposed highway is anyone’s guess. 
The problem is exacerbated when it 
comes to the cost of repairing or recon-
structing existing highways. As Interstate 
highways reach the end of their useful 
lives, along with countless other roads 
and bridges built from the Great Depres-
sion to the post-War years, America faces 
a large bill for highway maintenance and 
reconstruction. These maintenance and 
rebuilding projects are unlikely to “pay 
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for themselves” through gas tax revenue 
created from increased driving—indeed, 
to the extent that drivers switch to other 
forms of travel during lengthy construc-
tion periods, they may result in decreased 
revenue, at least for a time. These mainte-
nance and rebuilding projects will come to 
make a growing claim on existing sources 
of gasoline tax revenue, leaving less money 
for expansion projects that raise additional 
revenue by increasing driving. In other 
words, if so-called “user fees” aren’t raising 
enough revenue to pay for adequate main-
tenance of these highways now—before 
the hefty bill for reconstruction comes 
due—they are highly unlikely to do so in 
the future.
Moreover, in recent years researchers 
have begun to question a central assump-
tion of the “user fee” model: the belief 
that the number of vehicle-miles traveled 
(VMT) per capita will continue to rise 
steadily over time. A 2008 Brookings In-
stitution study found that national vehicle 
miles traveled hit a plateau in 2004 and 
began a decline in 2007 that was unprec-
edented since World War II.63 While VMT 
has bounced back slightly in recent months, 
it remains well below 2006 levels.64
Much of the growth in VMT over the 
past half century has been connected to 
the increasing availability of cars; evidence 
shows that once someone owns a car, he 
or she is likely to use it.66 Today, however, 
there are few American households without 
a car, so there are few prospects to increase 
vehicle penetration. Per-capita vehicle 
ownership hit a plateau in 2000 after de-
cades of consistent growth.67 In 2009, the 
number of motor vehicles in the United 
States actually dropped as more existing 
vehicles were scrapped than new ones pur-
chased.68 So increased vehicle ownership is 
likely out as a potential trigger for future 
increases in driving.
So, too, are massive increases in the driv-
ing-age population. According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau, between 1969 and 2010, 
the number of Americans between 25 and 
64 years of age—the period of maximum 
per-capita VMT—nearly doubled from 89 
million to 164 million.69 However, over the 
next 40 years, the number of prime driv-
ing-age Americans is projected to increase 
by only another 21 percent.70 Meanwhile, 
the population of older Americans—who 
drive fewer miles per year than younger 
Americans—is projected to explode in 
coming decades, more than doubling by 
2050, suggesting that stagnation in per-
capita VMT is likely to continue for years 
to come.71
Finally, there are indications that 
today’s younger Americans are less likely 
to drive than their counterparts in earlier 
generations. The percentage of teenagers 
with driver’s licenses—which peaked at 
71 percent in 1983—has since declined to 
56 percent in 2007.72 The proportion of 
vehicle-miles driven by people aged 21-30 
has also declined in recent years.73 While 
many of these changes are likely due to 
economic and demographic shifts, there is 
also evidence that young people are seeking 
out less car-dependent lifestyles. Demand 
has increased for housing in walkable 
communities with access to transit and a 
variety of amenities and the potential for 
shorter commutes.74 Some analysts suggest 
that changing lifestyles—particularly the 
increased importance of digital technology 
in the lives of young people—make driving 
long distances less appealing. According to 
a recent analysis of real-estate trends by a 
Canadian consulting firm:
There is also growing research 
that younger generations do 
not relate to the automobile as 
enabling “freedom.” Instead, 
their electronic and social media 
devices—whether a smart phone, 
small lap top computer, music 
player, etc.—provide an alternate 
means for self expression and 
being free to do what they want. 
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… Younger generations seem to 
have less interest in automotive 
use, making apartment living in 
dense, walkable and transit-ori-
ented urban areas a more natural 
fit for their lifestyles.75
In short, highways have never fully “paid 
for themselves” through gasoline taxes and 
other user fees, are doing so less than ever 
today, and there is good reason to believe 
that they will be unable to do so in the 
future, at least in the absence of a dramatic 
increase in user fees that will make alterna-
tive modes of travel even more attractive 
than they are today.
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If gasoline taxes are not truly “user fees” and if those fees fail to pay much more than half the cost of highway infrastruc-
ture—never mind compensate society for 
the many external costs of driving—just 
why do these myths continue to arise in 
the transportation debate?
The myths are extremely useful to back-
ers of a highway-oriented transportation 
system in the struggle to obtain a large 
share of a scarce resource (tax revenue) for 
their preferred public policy ends. 
The user fee myth is often invoked to 
make investments in alternative forms of 
transportation appear more “expensive” 
than investments in highways. Highway 
advocates often contrast the share of costs 
paid by highway users with the share paid 
by users of other forms of transportation to 
make highways appear to be a less expen-
sive solution to transportation problems. 
Here is the Cato Institute’s Randal 
O’Toole, discussing federal transporta-
tion spending: “House Transportation 
Committee Chairman James Oberstar, 
Minnesota Democrat, wants to increase 
transit’s share of federal surface transporta-
tion funding from 15 to nearly 30 percent. 
But transit riders pay only a third of the 
operating costs and none of the capital 
costs of transit, while highway users pay 80 
to 90 percent of highway costs.”76 (emphasis 
added)
And here is a report from the Reason 
Institute: “Since transit is unable to gener-
ate significant user revenues the way highways 
can, it is a far more appropriate candidate 
than highways for general-fund support.”77 
(emphasis added)
The contrast between the supposed abil-
ity of highways to generate user revenue 
and the inability of transit to do so—never 
mind non-motorized forms of transporta-
tion such as bicycling and walking—is 
raised again and again in arguments over 
transportation policy. From the perspective 
of deciding which projects to build, such 
distinctions are (or should be) meaning-
less—America should invest in transpor-
tation projects that bring the greatest net 
benefits to the greatest number of people, 
regardless of how they are paid for. 
Highway advocates also employ the 
user-fee argument to preserve privileged 
access for highways to funding from the 
gasoline tax, which, despite recent de-
creases in purchasing power, remains a 
potent generator of revenue. Advocates of 
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highway-centered transportation policy 
deploy the user-fee argument to ensure 
continued first dibs on a dedicated revenue 
source. Dedicated funding is immensely 
valuable to advocates of any social agenda 
because it ensures access to (at least) a 
steady stream of funding without requiring 
repeated pleading to elected representatives 
in the annual appropriations process.
Ken Orski, author of the Innovation 
NewsBriefs newsletter, recently wrote, for 
example: “Those who urge restoring the 
Trust Fund to its original purpose are not 
necessarily against streetcars, bicycles or 
‘walkable communities.’ … But let those 
amenities be funded by state and local gov-
ernments, they say, or by general revenues, 
as are a host of other social programs that 
are deemed worthy of federal support.”78
Orski knows, as do all highway advo-
cates, that funding from a dedicated source 
is far easier to secure than funding in an an-
nual appropriations process—particularly 
in difficult budgetary times. By granting 
dedicated funding to a particular social 
aim, government prioritizes that activity 
over and above other social aims. Those 
who would advocate for dedicating all 
gasoline tax revenue to highways are, in 
essence, arguing that highways are more 
important than investments in other alter-
natives—especially since these advocates 
are rarely to be found arguing for similar 
levels of general federal spending on other 
transportation modes. 
The “user fee” argument becomes, in 
other words, an argument about the pre-
ferred direction of transportation policy 
by other means.
Highway advocates also tend to make 
two other arguments for dedicating federal 
gas taxes to highways. 
(1) Interstate highways are cast as 
national priorities—worthy of federal 
support—while transit and other alter-
natives are declared to be merely local 
issues. 
The Reason Foundation, for example, 
recently argued that funds from the federal 
gasoline tax should be dedicated only to 
Interstate highways—eliminating fund-
ing both for transit and for aid to states 
for their own highway systems. The as-
sumption at the core of this argument is 
that there is something special about the 
Interstate Highway System that makes 
it—and it alone—worthy of dedicated 
federal support from the gasoline tax. The 
idea is that the Interstate system is, at its 
core, about the movement of people and 
goods across state lines—a truly federal 
function—while transit and other trans-
portation alternatives are about moving 
people around metropolitan areas, which 
represents a state or local function.
For example, the Reason Foundation 
argues that “Traffic calming in Tampa or 
Boise, or bike paths in Buffalo or Phoenix, 
do not provide national benefits and should 
not be federally funded.”79
This line of argument is a throwback to 
the original vision of the Interstate High-
way System as providing long-distance 
highway connections. But it is consistent 
neither with how the Interstate system 
was actually built out, nor with how the 
system it is used today. Indeed, Interstates 
play as significant a role in metropolitan-
level transportation as they do for the 
interstate movement of people and goods. 
Two out of every three vehicle-miles trav-
eled on the Interstate system are on urban 
Interstates, which presumably serve local 
or metropolitan mobility needs—just as 
do transit systems.80 While urban Inter-
states certainly play an important role in 
the interstate movement of goods, their 
primary function—as evidenced by the 
massive traffic jams on urban Interstates 
any weekday morning—is to get people to 
and from their homes, jobs, schools, and 
places of recreation. 
Moreover, it is legitimate to ask why the 
long-distance movement of cars or freight 
should be any more of a national priority 
than providing efficient transit and inter-
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city rail access to the core of our major 
financial, political and cultural capitals; 
reducing America’s crushing dependence 
on oil; facilitating transportation in met-
ropolitan areas, which are the engines of 
our national economy; alleviating highway 
congestion through other means (such as 
investments in transit or car-pooling); or 
even, for that matter, promoting improved 
health and mobility through investments in 
bicycling and pedestrian infrastructure.
The federal government could have 
chosen to fulfill its “interstate commerce” 
role under the Constitution by simply 
paying for the construction of small seg-
ments of highway that cross state borders. It 
didn’t. Instead, the federal government has 
historically taken a more expansive view, 
demonstrating an understanding of the 
importance of transportation links within 
metropolitan areas and the need to link 
various transportation modes effectively. 
(2) Highway investments are touted 
as “transportation” investments; every-
thing else is “social policy.” Highway 
advocates often argue that highway expen-
ditures represent investments in transpor-
tation, as opposed to investments in other 
transportation alternatives and programs, 
which are pigeonholed as “social policy.” 
For example, the recent Reason Foundation 
report asserts that:
[A]sking federal highway users to pay 
substantially more in order to fund 
expanded programs for sidewalks, 
bikeways, recreational trails and 
more transit is unlikely to succeed, 
since the large majority of highway 
users do not use, and would not 
benefit from, these mostly local-
ized urban projects. Principles of 
federalism suggest that these kinds 
of projects are more appropriately 
funded at state or local levels of 
government. But if Congress sees 
fit to continue them at the federal 
level, they should be supported by 
all taxpayers, as the kind of social 
infrastructure funded by federal 
agencies concerned with urban 
amenities (HUD) and outdoor rec-
reation (Interior).81
Leaving aside both the fact that federal 
gasoline taxes are paid by all drivers (not 
just users of federal highways), and the 
federalism argument, Reason’s argument—
mimicked by other highway advocates—is 
that highways are essentially the only 
reasonable “transportation” investments 
government can make. Any other invest-
ments—from transit to sidewalks—are 
forms of “social policy.”
This inherent bias against non-automo-
tive forms of transportation as legitimate 
transportation options sometimes emerges 
in the form of condescension and some-
times in the form of virulent rhetoric, such 
as this post from Randal O’Toole’s Anti-
planner blog: “Supporters of more subsidies 
to transit, cycling, and other programs 
bristle when opponents use terms like ‘so-
cialism’ and ‘social engineering.’ But it is 
pure socialism when government agencies 
can spend billions of dollars without any 
worries about whether user fees will cover 
those costs.”82
The highway advocates’ argument is 
rooted in their obsessive focus on the 
abstract notion of “mobility,” which often 
surfaces in their desire to compare the 
number of passenger miles traveled on vari-
ous transportation modes as the measure of 
their value. Observers such as Wendell Cox 
and Ronald Utt of the Heritage Foundation 
make much of comparing the federal dol-
lars spent on transportation per passenger 
mile, arguing that riders of transit and 
other modes are more subsidized.83 
Yet, what most individuals strive for 
is not to maximize their “mobility” as 
measured by the number of miles traveled 
each year. People value the simple ability 
to get where they need to go, whether that 
destination is around the block, on the 
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other side of a metropolitan area, or across 
the country. An urban dweller who rides 
a light rail line a single stop to a favorite 
restaurant gains the same utility from that 
trip as a suburban resident who drives 10 
miles to his or her favorite eatery. Side-
walks, bikeways and transit are not simply 
“urban amenities,” but are also legitimate 
forms of transportation. 
The decision to pursue policies that 
maximize the volume of distances trav-
elled—without the consideration of other 
social contexts and imperatives—is itself 
an exercise in social policy. No reasonable 
observer would argue that the decision 
to build the Interstate Highway Network 
did not have major ramifications for social 
policy—fueling the growth of suburban 
communities, bringing opportunities for 
jobs and recreation closer to many Ameri-
cans, and imposing massive changes on the 
environment and America’s urban fabric. 
There is simply no way to separate trans-
portation policy from social policy—they 
are intertwined.
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So far, we’ve established that gasoline taxes are not true “user fees,” that they have historically funded purposes 
other than highways, that they have never 
paid the full freight for nation’s roads, and 
that they represent a shrinking share of 
the transportation funding pie. We have 
also examined some of the uses to which 
the highway financing myths have been 
put in decisions regarding transportation 
policy.
But if highway users aren’t currently 
paying the full cost of roads, shouldn’t 
they? 
It is tempting to resort to simple maxims 
such as “drivers should pay for the roads 
they use” in describing the ideal policy for 
transportation funding. But to even ask the 
question this way is to put the cart before 
the horse.
Sound transportation decision-making 
begins by understanding that the issues 
of what we should build and who should 
pay for it are separate—if intimately re-
lated—questions. When we let the ability 
of a transportation mode to “pay for itself” 
shape what types of infrastructure we 
build, then we miss opportunities to build 
transportation systems that provide the 
greatest benefit to society as a whole.
Choosing What to Build
The first step towards developing a sensible 
system of transportation finance is to de-
velop a sensible system for deciding which 
transportation projects to build. These 
decisions must be made independently of 
the question of the mix of revenues that 
pay for those projects.
To understand why, consider the situ-
ation states currently find themselves in 
when choosing between investments in 
various transportation modes. If a state 
wishes to expand a highway, it receives an 
80 percent federal match and can use fed-
eral transportation funds for that purpose 
with virtually no questions asked. The re-
maining 20 percent of the funds can come 
from state gasoline taxes.
On the other hand, a state seeking 
federal support for a new transit line must 
compete against projects from other states 
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through the New Starts process. While 
transit projects technically can receive an 
80 percent federal match, in practice the 
match is typically around 50 percent, since 
the New Starts process favors application 
in which state and local governments 
provide a greater share of the funds.84 In 
many states, finding those local funds is ex-
tremely difficult since gasoline tax revenue 
is off-limits for transit projects.
It is not hard to see how this system 
skews transportation decision-making—
making it far easier for states to expand 
highways than to invest in transit, even 
when the transit investment will deliver 
greater benefits.
The United States should invest in 
transportation infrastructure that deliv-
ers the greatest possible net benefits for 
society, regardless of how the money to 
pay for those investments is raised. It may 
be, for example, that particular types of 
transportation investments cannot—or 
should not—be counted upon to “pay their 
own way” through user fees, but that these 
investments should be pursued because of 
the broad benefits they deliver to society. 
To make the proper investments for 
America’s future—and to protect taxpayers 
from the temptation to spend money on 
boondoggle projects while other urgent 
needs remain unaddressed—the nation 
should compare potential transportation 
infrastructure projects based on their costs 
and benefits both within and across modes. 
In so doing, we must do cost-benefit analy-
sis the right way. That means incorporating 
all of the many costs and benefits (see page 
19) that result from transportation invest-
ments and evaluating those investments 
for their impacts during the lifetime of 
the investment. Projects should be assessed 
across the long-term; not just as short-term 
budget choices. 
Some states have taken important steps 
in the right direction. Washington state, 
for example, requires regional trans-
portation planning agencies to develop 
transportation plans based on least-cost 
principles. The state defines least-cost 
planning as “[a] planning analysis that 
identifies the most cost-effective, multimodal 
project and program investment strategies, 
while taking into account supply and de-
mand, full life cycle costs and project and pro-
gram externalities.”85 (emphasis in original) 
Importantly, Washington’s approach does 
not value “mobility for mobility’s sake” but 
rather requires the consideration of both 
programs to increase transportation supply 
and those that reduce demand as legitimate 
solutions to transportation challenges.
Tying transportation investments to the 
availability of so-called “user fee” revenue 
distorts transportation decision-making, 
ignoring the broader and indirect benefits 
and costs from different transportation 
investments, and asserting the primacy 
of only one consideration: the ability to 
raise money for the project through user-
related fees.
Deciding How to Pay for 
Transportation
Transportation investments should ideally 
be financed based on a broad assessment of 
the costs and benefits of the investment. 
Gasoline taxes, transit fares, license fees 
and tolls, among other “user fees,” are part 
of the picture. So too, however, are general 
government revenues, parking fees, impact 
fees on developers, value-capture mecha-
nisms that reap some of the increased value 
of land near transportation infrastructure, 
and revenues from programs that put a 
price on greenhouse gas pollutants.
But divvying up the bill for transporta-
tion investments solely on the basis of the 
benefits received by various constituen-
cies is not likely to be a perfect solution. 
Government may choose, for example, to 
subsidize some forms of transportation in-
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How Best to Price Transportation
The questions of how to pay for transportation and what price to put on trans-portation services are usually linked in the minds of the public and decision-
makers. They shouldn’t be. When setting prices on transportation services, the 
primary concern must be getting the best possible use out of the public’s investment 
in infrastructure, not necessarily maximizing revenue from users.
Economic principles suggest that in a competitive market, the price of a good 
or service will align with its “marginal cost”—that is the cost of producing one 
additional unit of the good or service. Transit service provides a good example of 
how this works in practice. For a transit service that is operating near its capacity 
on a busy weekday morning, the costs of serving an additional passenger may be 
very high—the transit agency may need to run more buses and hire more drivers 
or even invest in a new rail line to serve the additional demand. The price that the 
agency charges for these trips should ideally be higher than the price charged for 
trips in the middle of a weekday afternoon, where there may be idle capacity just 
waiting to be used and where the cost of accommodating an additional passenger 
on a half-empty bus is close to zero.
In addition, prices should reflect the total costs imposed by additional users—in-
cluding costs on the rest of society. A weekday afternoon bus rider may impose 
little in the way of external costs, but a weekday afternoon driver will, in the form 
of air pollution, oil consumption, and a range of other impacts. In this situation, it 
is societally beneficial to encourage people to use transit in the form of lower fares 
for off-peak transit riders—even if doing so violates common notions of charging 
people for their “fair share” of the cost of the infrastructure.
In the case of automobile travel, an optimal pricing system might include con-
gestion pricing, fees for emissions of greenhouse gases and other air pollutants, 
an end to free or subsidized parking, and the shifting of some costs (such as auto 
insurance) from lump-sum charges to charges that vary based on the number of 
miles driven. For many transit systems, it might make sense to move in the op-
posite direction—toward pricing systems that encourage ridership through lower 
fares and that recognize the benefits that transit riders deliver to drivers and the 
remainder of society through a shifting of motor vehicle charges to transit. Under 
such a system, the burden of paying for transit might shift toward “lump sum” 
charges—tax revenue, revenues from pass sales, and subscription fees from major 
institutions, for example. Meanwhile, transit systems without spare capacity might 
raise fares on crowded lines or during rush hours.
The point in this discussion is that the notion that simply divvying up the cost 
of transportation infrastructure evenly among the users of that infrastructure is 
likely to lead to less-than-ideal results. 
frastructure to achieve other public policy 
ends. These subsidies may take the form of 
free transit passes for students, dial-a-ride 
service for the disabled, the improvement 
of a road that provides access to an iso-
lated rural community, or improvements 
in transportation infrastructure designed 
to attract job-creating industries. In other 
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words, government may legitimately decide 
that the capacity of a particular subset of 
the public to pay their “fair share” of the 
costs of a given investment should not stand 
in the way of the broader benefits of that 
investment to the rest of society—or the 
realization of simple fairness in ensuring 
that the broadest possible cross-section of 
Americans is able to benefit from invest-
ments in the transportation system.
Gasoline Taxes Shouldn’t  
Be Dedicated to Roads
In virtually any vision of the nation’s trans-
portation future, highways will continue 
to play a critical role in getting Americans 
where they need to go. With many of the 
nation’s highways and bridges aging—and in 
the wake of years of deferred maintenance—
there will be no shortage of worthwhile 
highway projects for the nation to invest 
in, even if the goal is simply to maintain the 
infrastructure we already have.
What is the harm, then, in simply 
dedicating revenue from gasoline taxes to 
highways?
The harm is that dedication of gasoline 
tax revenue to highway projects inherently 
prejudices transportation decision-making 
in favor of highways. In the current atmo-
sphere of massive state budget shortfalls 
and federal budget deficits, there is simply 
no way to ensure that other transporta-
tion priorities receive adequate investment 
if highways get first dibs on dedicated 
funding. If the choice facing local deci-
sion-makers, for example, is to build or 
expand a highway with federal funding or 
do nothing at all, those decision-makers are 
likely to build the highway, even if other, 
harder-to-fund transportation solutions 
would provide greater overall benefits.
If gasoline tax revenues are to be dedi-
cated to transportation, all transportation 
modes must have the ability to compete for 
that funding on a level playing field with 
consideration of long-term benefits. Just as 
there are ample opportunities for meaning-
ful investment in highway repair, so too are 
there many opportunities for worthwhile 
investments in transit, high-speed rail, and 
active transportation projects such as bike 
lanes and pedestrian facilities, as well as 
investment in technologies and practices 
—such as sound barriers and traffic calm-
ing—that ensure that our transportation 
infrastructure melds itself effectively into 
our communities.
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To develop sensible transportation policy in the United States for the future, we need to face a few impor-
tant truths.
The first truth is that the “user fee/
highways pay for themselves” story that 
highway advocates promote to achieve their 
desired policy outcomes is a myth. Gaso-
line taxes aren’t “user fees.” And gas taxes 
and other vehicle charges have rarely paid 
the full cost of building and maintaining 
highways—and have never paid for the full 
costs of highway construction and driving 
to the rest of society. 
The second truth is that the “user fee/
highways pay for themselves” model is even 
less likely to work in the future—at least 
at the levels of gasoline taxation that have 
become familiar to Americans. Americans 
are driving less than they did a few years 
ago and are doing so in more fuel-efficient 
vehicles. There is little reason to believe 
that the steady growth in vehicle travel 
that characterized the post-War period will 
continue in the 21st century, due to chang-
ing demographics and shifting consumer 
preferences, not to mention the prospect 
of higher oil prices. Finally, whereas in the 
post-War period America increasingly built 
new highways that spurred more driving 
and created more gas tax revenue, the most 
costly challenge facing the nation now is in 
repairing and reconstructing our existing 
highway network. The increasing taxpayer 
bailouts of the Highway Trust Fund in 
recent years are just a harbinger of the 
problems to come—the “user fee/highways 
pay for themselves” model, to the extent it 
ever worked at all, is irretrievably broken.
The final truth is that, in many ways, 
the “user fee/highways pay for themselves” 
model is a bad model for transportation 
policy. It does a poor job of approximating 
the costs imposed by and benefits gained 
from various transportation investments. 
It ensures that transportation projects in 
general, and highway projects in particular, 
receive a guaranteed source of funding, 
regardless of whether more pressing pri-
orities exist elsewhere. And it creates the 
presumption that transportation invest-
ments will be made based on geography 
and other factors that have nothing to do 
with the benefits the project will deliver for 
society—a recipe for wasteful, pork-barrel 
spending. 
If America is to make the right trans-
portation choices for the 21st century, we 
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need to rely less on myths and outdated as-
sumptions and instead make clear-headed 
decisions about which transportation in-
vestments will deliver the greatest benefits 
for the nation in the years ahead.
Different transportation advocates, pun-
dits and lobbyists will offer very different 
visions of what America’s future transpor-
tation system should look like—and the 
debate among those points of view is one 
very much worth having. How important, 
for example, is creation of a high-speed rail 
network? Should we engage in a major pro-
gram of highway expansion at a time of in-
creasing concern about oil supplies and the 
environment? How should transportation 
and questions about the future structure of 
our communities intersect? These are the 
types of questions Americans should be 
asking—particularly as the nation attempts 
to meet its transportation needs during 
economically troubled times.
We also need to have a debate about how 
America should fund future transportation 
investments, particularly given public reti-
cence to increase the gasoline tax. 
A real debate about America’s trans-
portation future is not aided, however, by 
outdated—and often misleading—stories 
about how America’s transportation fund-
ing system has worked historically and 
works today. 
The time has come to put these myths 
to rest, once and for all, so that the nation 
can have a meaningful and well-grounded 
debate about where to go next.
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